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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
CaseNo.20040877-CA 
GERALD STEVEN WALLACE, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
This Reply Brief first responds to the state's Statement of Facts (Point I), and then 
to its arguments as to insufficient evidence (Point II), ineffective assistance of counsel 
(Point III), and the illegal sentence (Point IV). 
Point 1: Response to Utah's Statement of Facts - Mr. Wallace's 
Inspection. 
The Brief of Appellee, at 4, states that Gerald Steven Wallace, defendant/appellant 
herein, decided to participate in the business arrangement previously referred to herein as 
the Program "without performing any investigation." This is not correct. Before the first 
real estate transaction at issue was executed, Mr. Wallace's real estate agent, Cal Udy, 
contacted the Utah State Division of Real Estate, faxed it the sales contract, and was 
informed by a Division investigator that nothing was wrong with the contract. The 
investigator noted that the transaction, as with every business transaction, might give rise 
to litigation if the money was not paid. (R. 413, at 269:1-11.) Mr. Udy told Mr. Wallace 
that he was "completely comfortable with [the investigator's] response and that he had no 
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problems going forward, and that it was his opinion that everything was just fine." (R. 
413, at 356:4-7.) In addition to dealing and sharing information with Mr. Udy, Mr. 
Wallace also dealt directly with the real estate broker who was Mr. Udy's boss, and who 
investigated the propriety of the Program before allowing Mr. Udy to participate. No one 
advised the broker that the deals were suspect despite his extensive inquiry. (R. 413, at 
221:1-25, 232:15-233:7, 354:1-19.) 
Also before the first real estate transaction, Mr. Wallace's real estate agent, Mr. 
Udy, met with a FBI investigator along with an investigator from the Utah State 
Insurance Commission. (R. 413, at 262:7-24.) If the FBI or Insurance Commission 
investigator had given Mr. Udy any cause to believe that the first transaction should not 
occur, Mr. Udy would not have participated. (R. 413, at 275:2-5.) Mr. Udy told Mr. 
Wallace about this meeting as well. (R. 413, at 275:20-25.) 
Before the first transaction was executed between Richard Van Roo (seller) and 
Mr. Wallace (buyer), Mr. Roo had the Senior Vice President of his bank examine the 
deal. He had an officer at the bank that would be carrying the loan - and thus would be 
sharing the risk thereon - look at the details. He took the transaction to the accountant 
with whom he had dealt for twenty years. He also had an attorney look at it. According 
to Mr. Roo, each one of these professionals advised that there was nothing to be afraid of. 
(R. 412, at 93:18-94:23.) Mr. Wallace was aware that Mr. Roo had asked at least the 
bank officer and the accountant about the transaction, and he knew that Mr. Roo was 
going ahead with the transaction. (R. 413, at 353:9-19, 354:23-355:1.) 
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Over eighteen months, Mr. Wallace observed the fund operating as Mr. Anderson 
said it was supposed to, and even spoke with a seller who said she'd participate again if 
she had any more property. (R. 413, at 371:4-373:13.) It is true that Mr. Wallace took 
the word of Al Anderson, one of the four people who created and implemented the 
Program, that they were able to generate enough income off the fund into which the 
purchase money for each real estate sale was initially placed, to pay the seller a good 
return on his/her money, as well as to fund the buyer's mortgage obligations. But then so 
did Mr. Udy. As was the case between Mr. Anderson and Mr. Wallace, Mr. Anderson 
provided Mr. Udy only the basic details about how the fund supposedly generated enough 
income to benefit both buyers and sellers. Even though Mr. Udy, like Mr. Wallace, 
didn't totally understand the details, Mr. Udy was satisfied: "[Al Anderson] just told me 
that he'd make sure the payments were made, don't worry about it and at that point in 
time, quite frankly, I totally trusted the man." (R. 413, at 258:1-21.) 
Point II: There Was Insufficient Evidence that Mr, Wallace "Willfully" 
Misrepresented or Withheld "Material" Information, 
The evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wallace 
willfully misrepresented or withheld material information in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§61-1-1(2). 
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden. A 
reviewing court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. A jury 
verdict will be reversed only where the evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
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defendant committed the crime." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^  10, 2 P.3d 954, 
quoting State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert denied 937 P.2d 
136 (Utah 1997). Circumstantial evidence may support a verdict where the inferences 
therefrom are logical and reasonable and, if believed, are sufficient to prove every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Speculation, however, may not support a verdict: "A guilty verdict is not legally 
valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." Id, quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1977), 
quoting State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). A reviewing court is 
obligated to reverse a jury verdict based upon speculation, or where circumstantial 
evidence does not permit rational inference sufficient to eliminate all reasonable doubts: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to 
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch 
the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the 
court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a 
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to 
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State in re J.S.H., 
Utah, 642 P.2d 386 (1982); State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 
(1980). 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444-45 (Utah 1983). 
The state's theory behind the three securities fraud counts was that Mr. Wallace 
willfully provided or withheld material information in violation of Utah Code Ann. §61-
1-1(2) (2000). (R. 414, at 421:23-426:6.) While jury instructions 31-33 reflect the 
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elements of Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-l(2)(material statements and omissions) and §61-1-
l(3)(fraud and deceit), state's counsel, in closing argument, quoted and argued only 
subsection (2). (See R. 414, at 421:23-426:6.) The Brief of Appellee, at 21-24, focuses 
exclusively upon subsection (2). Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) reads: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or 
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading;.... 
To violate Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2), one must act willfully. Utah Code Ann. § 
61-1-21(2) (2004 Supp.) "Willfully," in this context, does not mean that one must intend 
to violate the law; but only that one intend the act or omission that causes the violation. 
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1993). Thus, to sustain the three securities 
fraud convictions, there must be evidence that Mr. Wallace intended to make an untrue 
statement, or that he intentionally withheld information that would have clarified 
otherwise misleading statements. To support the securities fraud convictions, the 
statements and omissions must have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have 
been "material," and made "deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely 
accidentally or inadvertently." Id. at 1358 n.3. 
The Brief of Appellee, at 15-28, invokes the doctrine of invited error to argue that 
Mr. Wallace, having failed to object to the willfulness jury instruction at trial, cannot 
now argue that it misstates the law. Mr. Wallace does not challenge the judge's charge 
to the jury, only that there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could 
have concluded that Mr. Wallace willfully said or omitted anything that was material. 
The Brief of Appellee, at 30-33, argues that Mr. Wallace failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict. See State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, If 13, 51 
P.3d 21. The evidence favoring the verdict is, in fact, marshaled in the Brief of 
Appellant, at 28-29. The state's lament goes to the lack of said evidence, not to Mr. 
Wallace's failure to marshal it. 
The Brief of Appellee, at 34-35 identifies the following statements and omissions 
as supporting the securities fraud convictions: (1) Mr. Wallace's bankruptcy; (2) Mr. 
Anderson's felony conviction; (3) the risk the managers might abscond with the money, 
or that the fond was encumbered; (4) pending litigation; (5) a cease and desist order 
against Mr. Stewart; (6) information about bounced checks; and, (7) a personal 
guarantee. Each is addressed in turn below. 
1. Mr, Wallace's bankruptcy. The evidence before the jury about Mr. 
Wallace's bankruptcy was not material. Therefore, Mr. Wallace's failure to mention it to 
the three buyers cannot violate Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2)(2002). To be material, the 
information at issue must be reasonably calculated to make a difference: 
[Mjateriality is "'something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence 
and prudence would think to be of some importance in determining whether 
to buy or sell.5" Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1996) {quoting S 
&F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974)). 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, \ 29, 48 P.3d 235; accord Yazdv. Woodside Homes 
Corp., 2005 UT App 82, If 9, 109 P.3d 393. Ordinary intelligence and prudence are 
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gauged against an objective reasonableness standard. S &F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 627 
P.2d 217, 221-22 (Utah 1974). It might be nice to know whether the person with whom 
one is dealing is a faithful spouse, an opera aficionado, or a spiritual person, but only that 
which objectively bears upon a decision to buy or sell is considered material. 
While a history of bankruptcy may conjure images of financial irresponsibility, 
the opposite actually is true. A person who obtains full discharge from bankruptcy has 
managed, through honesty and discipline, lawfully to wipe clean his or her financial slate 
clean. See, e.g., 11 USCS § 524(a) (2005). "The purpose of the [Bankruptcy] Act is to 
release honest debtors from the burden of their debts." Swanson Petroleum Corp. v. 
Cumberland, 167 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Neb. 1969), quoting Robinson v. J.R. Williams & 
Co., 266 F. 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1920). 
A history of bankruptcy may, to the uninformed, imply a motive to defraud. Yet 
again, especially where the person's debts have been discharged, the opposite is true. 
Even prior to discharge, being involved in bankruptcy proceedings "in no way 
demonstrates that the defendant had a particular need for money at the time the crime 
was committed." United States v. Reed, 700 F.2d 638, 642 (11th Cir. 1983). Entering 
into bankruptcy is precisely the lawful means for "relieving the pressure which might 
compel him or her to commit a criminal act." Id; accord United States v. Bensimon, 172 
F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1999). In the context of judicial proceedings, evidence of 
poverty as financial motive is properly admitted only where it is linked with something 
more, such as drug addiction or severe, ongoing indebtedness. United States v. Jackson, 
882 F.2d 1444,1449-50 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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The only evidence of Mr. Wallace's bankruptcy in the case at bar was Exhibit 5, 
introduced and received at trial. These records indicate that Mr. Wallace and his wife 
filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter Seven of the Act, and that they successfully 
secured a complete release from all dischargeable debts on January 7, 1998 - more than 
two years and seven months before the first transaction was executed. Nothing else the 
least bit probative of the bankruptcy's materiality was introduced. 
One can imagine circumstances under which information about bankruptcy might 
be material; for example, if bankruptcy were declared in an attempt to fraudulently shield 
assets. Especially with regard to a bankruptcy fully discharged, however, one can 
imagine circumstances under which the filing was wholly immaterial; for example, 
where a family member becomes ill and is not covered by health insurance. 
In either scenario, owing to the lack of evidence, a juror would have had to 
speculate to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wallace's bankruptcy would 
have effected an objectively reasonable seller's decision to participate in the Program.1 
Because there was no evidence before the jury as to the materiality of the bankruptcy, 
Mr. Wallace cannot be said to have willfully withheld material evidence. 
2. Al Anderson's felony conviction, Mr. Wallace knew that Al Anderson was 
convicted of a felony eight years prior to Mr. Wallace's participation in the Program. 
Mr. Wallace, however, did not know what the conviction was for. (R. 413, at 367:22-
368:16.) Nor did Mr. Wallace know he should have disclosed such information. (Id.) 
1
 It was improper for the state to argue during closing that, following full discharge, 
bankruptcy proceedings indicate "there's some problems with [Mr. Wallace's] financial 
circumstances." So too was defense counsel's failure to object. 
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Absolutely no evidence below, circumstantial or direct, controverts Mr. Wallace's 
testimony that he did not know he was required to disclose the conviction of a person 
who would have no legal relation with, or obligation to, the sellers. 
The state argues that Mr. Wallace should have investigated the nature of Mr. 
Anderson's conviction and, based upon that, informed the sellers of Mr. Anderson's 
criminal background. (R. 414, at 423:23-424:13.) Responding to Mr. Wallace's 
testimony that he neither knew what the conviction was for, nor that there was an 
obligation to inform potential sellers, the state declared, "Well, you'd better find out." 
(R. 414, at 424:8-9.) 
The state's argument merely confirms that Mr. Wallace's failure to investigate 
and announce was not willful. At worse, the failure to investigate and announce the 
particulars of Mr. Anderson's prior conviction was reckless; to wit, perhaps Mr. Wallace 
was "aware of but consciously disregarded] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3).2 No 
2
 § 76-2-103. Definitions. A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or 
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as 
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evidence exists that Mr. Wallace willfully refused to investigate and announce in order to 
facilitate the real estate transaction. 
3. Representations that the fund was "unencumbered"; and the risk that 
fund managers might abscond with the money. Perhaps the most far-fetched 
allegations involve the Placement Agreements executed in each transaction (Ex. 11,21, 
29), which recite that money in the fund would remain "unencumbered/5 and Mr. 
Wallace's alleged failure to warn others that someone might abscond with the sellers' 
money placed in the fund. No evidence exists that fond assets were encumbered by, for 
example, a mortgage or lien, or that the assets were being used to secure debt elsewhere. 
Thus the state's allegation regarding encumbrance fails from the start. This reply brief, 
however, will address these claims as allegations that Mr. Wallace withheld information 
about the general integrity of the fond. 
First and foremost, Mr. Wallace had no more knowledge than did the sellers with 
whom he dealt that fund principals might steal from the fond. That someone with access 
to money, whether an attorney, broker, employee or sales clerk, might steal it is an 
unavoidable fact of life of which everyone, buyers and sellers alike, must be aware. Mr. 
Wallace, however, based upon his investigation and that of his real estate agent, not only 
purchased real estate in reliance upon the integrity of the fond, he also urged his four 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
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siblings to do so. Each also took out second mortgages to free up more capital to deposit 
into the fund - by which they assumed roles similar to that of the sellers. Due to the 
subsequent theft of fund assets, Mr. Wallace, his brothers and a sister lost their homes, 
cars and favorable credit ratings. They were financially devastated. (R. 413, at 357:6-
21,370:6-19.) 
The state argues this only proves Mr. Wallace was not an effective swindler. The 
state misses the point. Mr. Wallace's faith in the fund's integrity only corroborates the 
evidence that he misunderstood the risk. 
Perhaps he should have better understood the risk. But there is absolutely no 
evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that he did. At worst, Mr. Wallace's failure to 
warn about a risk he did not understand was criminally negligent or reckless. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-103(3), (4). It was not, and could not have been, willful. 
4. Pending litigation against the fund, McAllister, Stewart and others. The 
state argues that Mr. Wallace's failure to inform the sellers about a lawsuit involving the 
fund, Mr. McAllister and Mr. Stewart, constitutes a material omission. The lawsuit was 
Gleave v. Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc., Case No. 000800059-PR (8th Jud. Dist., 
Duchesne County 2000). Mr. Wallace, however, did not know about the lawsuit, nor did 
he have any reason to believe it was necessary to check with every government agency 
to determine whether the fund or its principals were involved with litigation. (R. 413, at 
368:17-24.) No evidence suggests that Mr. Wallace had knowledge of the lawsuit. 
As was the case with Mr. Anderson's felony conviction (section 3, supra), the 
state argued in closing that Mr. Wallace should have investigated whether anyone 
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involved with the Program had been sued. The state also argued from Exhibit 9, the 
Verified Complaint filed in Gleave3 (R. 414, at 425:23-426:6.) 
Once again, Mr. Wallace's failure to check every government agency to 
determine whether any proceedings involving the fund or fund principals constitutes, at 
worst, criminal negligence or recklessness. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3), (4). His 
failure to disclose what he did not know could not have been willful. 
Moreover, the docket from Gleave establishes that when the three real estate 
transactions at issue were completed, two in September 2000, and the other in January 
2001, see Exhibits 10, 20, 26, nothing probative of the defendants' wrongdoing had 
occurred. (The docket from the filing of Gleave, through and including April 10, 2001, 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.) Interestingly, on July 26, 2000, the docket reflects that 
all claims against the fund were dismissed. Ex. 1, at 3.4 On August 14, 2000, a 
preliminary injunction hearing was continued because the parties had reached a 
stipulation. Id. at 4-5. On January 29, 2001, the parties informed the court that the case 
had been settled. Id. at 5-6. Not only does Mr. Wallace's failure to research the 
3
 The Gleave complaint was admitted as Exhibit 9 without objection from defense 
counsel. A complaint is written to tell but one side of the story. It is a tool of advocacy. 
That a lawsuit was filed might conceivably have been relevant (but see discussion, infra). 
A complaint, however, is intended to be prejudicial to the defendant. Its introduction into 
evidence below likely violates Utah R. Evid. 403 and 802. Defense counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by not objecting to its admission. 
4
 Improper was the state's argument regarding "significant litigation" against defendants 
including the fund. (R. 414, at 425:23-426:6.) Defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by not objecting thereto. Then, even defense counsel erroneously referred to a 
lawsuit against the fund during closing argument. (R. 414, 434:10.) 
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Duchesne County court records fail to constitute a "willful" omission, the documents he 
would have found would have disclosed nothing material. 
5. A cease and desist order against Paul Stewart, The state argues that Mr. 
Wallace willfully failed to discover and announce to the three sellers a cease-and-desist 
order issued against Mr. Stewart. The Emergency Order and Order to Show Cause were 
admitted at trial as Exhibit 7. 
Mr. Wallace, however, did not know about the order when the three transactions 
occurred. (R. 413, at 369:20-22.) No evidence exists to the contrary. Mr. Wallace's 
failure to discover this information might, at worst, constitute criminal negligence or 
recklessness. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3), (4). His failure to disclose what he did not 
know simply may not be deemed willful. 
6. Information about bounced checks. The Brief of Appellee, at 35, notes that 
Mr. Wallace did not tell the third seller that two checks written on the fund to the first 
seller had failed to clear.5 In fact, the first check was written for $397.65 on December 
13,2000, and was intended to cover the December 2000 interest payment. The second 
check was written on December 28, 2000 for $402.65. (Ex. 19.) The second was 
supposed to cover the first, plus the five-dollar service fee the seller incurred when the 
first check failed to clear (R. 412, at 123:6-124:24). 
5
 The two checks in question were written after the second seller's transaction was 
concluded, and approximately one month before the third seller's transaction was 
concluded; thus if this omission were deemed both material and willful, it could be used 
only to support the verdict on the third count of securities fraud. 
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There exists no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that Mr. Wallace knew the 
December checks were symptomatic of an emerging problem with the fund. In fact, the 
same seller to whom the two December checks were written received timely interest 
checks that cleared for the next several months. (R. 412, at 126:6-127:22.) Of note, as 
soon as Mr. Wallace realized there were problems with the fund, he was the first person 
to notify the second seller of his concerns - in August 2001 - two months before that 
seller's first check was even due. (R. 412, at 162:21-163:8.) No inference reasonably 
flows from the two December checks to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Wallace knew in December 2000 that there were problems with the fund, and that he 
willfully withheld this information from the third seller. 
7. A personal guarantee, Mr. Van Roo, the first seller, testified that he told Mr. 
Wallace how concerned he was for the safety of his money in the fund, and that Mr. 
Wallace responded that the fund was safe. According to Mr. Van Roo, "[Mr. Wallace] 
says, I can personally guarantee that." (R. 412, at 108:17-22.) Was this a willful 
misrepresentation aimed at ensnaring Mr. Van Roo, or a sincere, if misguided, 
assurance? All evidence in the record, circumstantial and otherwise, points to the latter. 
When the two checks made payable to Mr. Van Roo failed to clear in December 
2000, Mr. Wallace covered them from his own account. While there is no evidence in 
the record as to why or how it came about, Mr. Wallace ensured that Mr. Van Roo's 
monthly payments were covered on other occasions as well. See Ex. 19 (check nos. 537, 
557, 421375348, 1014 and 491, totaling $6,649). When Mr. Van Roo had trouble 
communicating with the fund principals, he would call Mr. Wallace: "Whenever there 
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was a problem I would call [Mr. Wallace]. He was good about getting back to me." (R. 
412, at 126:10-25.) 
No evidence exists from which a person could reasonably infer that Mr. Wallace's 
personal assurance was a willful misrepresentation. The assurance may have been 
unwise, perhaps even criminally negligent or reckless, but there is no evidence from 
which a reasonable person could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a 
willful misrepresentation. 
In sum, none of the statements or omissions the state contends were material and 
willful in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) were both material and willful. Quite 
simply, this is because Mr. Wallace, as a buyer, was every bit as taken in and victimized 
by the men who created and operated the Program as were the sellers. 
Point III: Mr, Wallace Did Not Receive Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The Brief of Appellee, at 28-30, argues that Mr. Wallace failed to preserve the 
sufficiency argument below. The Brief of Appellant, at 38-42, argues that, despite the 
failure to move for dismissal for insufficient evidence, defense counsel nonetheless put 
the court on notice when he raised the affirmative defense of lack of intent. If this court 
concludes that defense counsel failed to preserve this important issue for appeal, then 
certainly he provided ineffective assistance. 
The federal and Utah Constitutions guarantee an accused's right to effective 
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const, amends. VI and XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; see 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant claiming ineffective 
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assistance of counsel "must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to 
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \ 23, 84 P.3d 1183, quoting Wickham v. 
Galetto, 2002 UT 72,1f 19, 61 P.3d 978. 
Point II, supra, establishes the merit of Mr. Wallace's insufficiency claim. To 
summarize, none of the alleged misstatements or omissions were willful and material. 
Yet, defense counsel may have failed to preserve the issue with a motion to dismiss at the 
close of the state's case-in-chief or Mr. Wallace's. This is a motion routinely made, in 
nearly every case, out of the jury's presence. Judges and prosecutors expect it. No 
conceivable tactical advantage lies in omitting it - especially when it has merit. This 
blatant error was exacerbated by the shortcomings mentioned in notes 1, 3 and 4, supra.6 
If by his failure to preserve the insufficiency issue at trial, defense counsel has 
prevented its consideration on appeal, Mr. Wallace has been prejudiced. 
Point IV: The Imposition of 144 Months of Probation Was Illegal, 
The imposition of 144 months of probation was illegal. This court need not reach 
the issue of whether Utah law permits consecutive terms of probation because the court 
below never made clear its intention to do so. State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, 110 
6
 Defense counsel fleetingly referred to the issue of willfulness during his close when he 
said: "If you look at [Jury] Instruction No. 30, you look at willfully which talks about the 
mental state and I'll get back to that in a little bit....9' (R. 414, at 437:15-17 [in fact, 
Instruction No. 35, not No. 30, formally defined "willfully"].) But defense counsel never 
again referred to the definition of willfulness. Nor did he argue word-one about the 
materiality of the same information. 
16 
P.3d 149; State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied 779 P.2d 688 
(1989). 
Mr. Wallace was sentenced to four one-to-fifteen-year sentences for second degree 
felonies, and two zero-to-five-year sentences for third-degree felonies, to run 
consecutively. (R. 381-82.) This creates a potential range of incarceration of from four 
to seventy years. The court, however, suspended the prison sentences and imposed 144 
months of probation. (R. 383.) The state suggests this reflects the court's intent to 
impose six consecutive twenty-four month terms of probation. Brief of Appellee, at 48. 
In fact, there was no such rhyme or reason underlying the court's decision. The 
following exchange from the sentencing hearing establishes that the court's overriding 
concern was that Mr. Wallace pay restitution: 
The Court: ... I'm going to suspend the entirety of all of the sentences. 
I'm not imposing a fine. I'd rather see any money go towards restitution in 
this case rather than the payment of any fine. I don't want you on probation 
for 36 months. Probation is going to be a lot longer than that. J want it 
longer intentionally so that we're giving you as long an opportunity as 
possible to make restitution payments. How far can I set it with six 
consecutive felonies? 
Mr. ?: Well, I think you can run it 36 months -
The Court: Currently on each one? 
Ms. Barlow (the prosecutor): Mr. Harrison is on probation for 12 years. 
The Court: That's what I'm inclined to do in this particular case as well. 
Place you on probation for a period of 144 months, a 12-year period. I'm 
going to order restitution.... 
(R. 415, at 11:3-18 [emphasis added].) Mr. Harrison, by contrast, had pled guilty to two 
second-degree and two third-degree felonies. (R. 412, at 282:10-11.) The court 
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ultimately ordered Mr. Wallace to be responsible for $626,000, jointly and severally with 
defendants convicted of creating and implementing the Program. (R. 383.) 
The trial court imposed 144 months of probation for two reasons. First, it wanted 
to ensure that Mr. Wallace would repay the sellers as much restitution as possible. 
Second, the court was told that another person had been sentenced to 144 months of 
probation and, apparently, that sounded just about right for Mr. Wallace, as well. 
Whether Utah law authorizes consecutive terms of probation for multiple 
convictions remains unsettled. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, ^  20. In McDonald, the 
defendant was convicted of fifty-eight class C misdemeanors. Id. at ^ j 4. The trial court 
sentenced the defendant to fifty-eight ninety-day jail sentences, to run consecutively. The 
trial court suspended all but two days of the jail sentences and imposed fourteen and one-
half years of probation, the first two years of which were to be "formal probation." Id. at 
TF|{ 6, 18. Counsel for both parties reasonably assumed the probation term was calculated 
from ninety days for each conviction running consecutively - or, fourteen and one-half 
years. Id. at ^  18. The defendant challenged the legality of consecutive probation terms. 
Id. at U 17. 
On appeal, this court observed that a sentence may not be affirmed based upon 
speculation about the trial court's intent. An order that sentences run consecutively must 
be "unequivocal." Id. at ^ j 19, quoting Denney, 116 P.2d at 93. 
This court noted that the statutory maximum for probation upon conviction of a 
class C misdemeanor is twelve months. McDonald, 2005 UT App at ^  19, citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10(a)(i) (2003). It declared that if consecutive terms of probation 
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are legal, any such order must specifically state that the sentences are to run 
consecutively. Because no such order issued in the case on review, the fourteen-and-one-
half year probation term was terminated in favor of the twelve-month statutory 
maximum. Id. at ffi[ 21-22. 
The Denney opinion is similarly applicable to the case at bar. There, the defendant 
pled guilty to two third-degree felonies, and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 
zero to five years. The court suspended the prison terms and placed the defendant on 
probation for thirty-six months. Id. at 91-92. At that time, the statutory maximum 
probation for a felony was eighteen months. Id. at 92, citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(10)(a) (1986). Thus it was reasonable to assume the thirty-six-month probation 
reflected the two suspended sentences that were to run consecutively. The trial court 
declared as much at a subsequent hearing. Id. at 92-93. 
The defendant was subsequently arrested for violating probation sometime after 
the first eighteen months of probation, while the second eighteen-month term was 
running. The defendant moved to terminate probation based upon his having completed 
the statutory maximum eighteen-month period. The trial court denied the motion, 
revoked the defendant's probation, and imposed the two consecutive prison sentences. 
Id. at 92. 
This court acknowledged the trial court's probable intent to impose consecutive 
eighteen-month probation terms. It found, however, that at the time of sentencing, this 
intent was not unambiguous. Id. at 92-93. Because the trial court did not state, at the 
time of sentencing, that the thirty-six-month probation term was calculated upon two 
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consecutive eighteen-month terms, this court held that the defendant's probation had 
terminated upon reaching the statutory eighteen-month maximum. Id. at 93. 
In this case, the court's intent to impose consecutive probation terms is more 
ambiguous than in either McDonald or Denney. It obliquely referenced consecutive 
probation terms, but then adopted the exact length of probation already imposed upon 
another defendant who pled guilty to felonies that corresponded to neither the number nor 
the severity of those for which Mr. Wallace was convicted. The court provided no 
unequivocal indication of its intent to impose consecutive probation terms. 
This court, therefore, must vacate the probation order and impose the current 
thirty-six-month maximum for felony convictions. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) 
(2003). In so doing, the state remains free to seek an extension of probation as provided 
by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (2003). More immediate to the trial court's central 
concern that Mr. Wallace continue paying down the total restitution balance, the trial 
court "may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation 
for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(ii)(A) (2003), citingUtah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (2003)(defming 
accounts receivable to include unpaid restitution). 
CONCLUSION 
The three convictions for violating Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) should be 
reversed for insufficient evidence. In the alternative, the convictions should be vacated 
and the matter remanded for a new trial based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. 
20 
If the three convictions are either reversed or vacated, the conviction for engaging in a 
pattern of unlawful activity in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (2003) must 
also be reversed because the remaining convictions fail to establish a pattern of unlawful 
activity. The convictions for selling an unregistered security in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-7 (2000), and for selling a security without a license in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (2000), should be reversed for the reasons stated in the Brief of 
Appellant. In any event, the judgment imposing 144 months of probation should be 
reversed and the thirty-six-month statutory maximum imposed in its place. 
DATED this _/£5day of August, 2005. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 841114-0230, and four copies to the 
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Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this If"- day of August, 
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DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and to the Office of the Utah Attorney 
General as indicated above this day of August, 2005. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT-DUCHESNE 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CONSTANCE GLEAVE vs. JOHN 1-10 DOES 
CASE NUMBER 000800059 Property Rights 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
A. LYNN PAYNE 
PARTIES 
Defendant - ATTORNEY'S TITLE GUARANTY FUND 
Represented by: DAVID E WEST 
Defendant - ATTORNEY'S TITLE GUARANTY FUND 
Represented by: JEFFREY J HUNT 
Defendant - MORONI 1901 TRUST 
Represented by: STEPHEN G STOKER 
Defendant - FIDELITY TITLE A UT CORP. 
Defendant - GARY MICKELSON 
Represented by: STEPHEN G STOKER 
Defendant - L. DALE MCALLISTER 
Represented by: STEPHEN G STOKER 
Defendant - GLENN FRANDSEN 
Defendant - DAVID CASSETT 
Represented by: STEPHEN G STOKER 
Defendant - PAUL STEWART 
Represented by: STEPHEN G STOKER 
Defendant - JOHN 1-10 DOES 
Plaintiff - CONSTANCE GLEAVE 
Represented by: JAY D GURMANKIN 
Represented by: DANIEL W JACKSON 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 376.10 
Amount Paid: 376.10 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
Printed: 07/18/05 10:51:21 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 000800059 Property Rights 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
Amount Due: 50.00 
Amount Paid: 50.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
FEE 
- NO AMT 
120.00 
120.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.00 
3.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CROSSCLAIM 10K-MORE 
Amount Due: 90.00 
Amount Paid: 90.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES 
Amount Due: 26.35 
Amount Paid: 2 6.35 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 8.00 
Amount Paid: 8.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: MISCELLANEOUS FEE 
Amount Due: 31.00 
Amount Paid: 31.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: MISCELLANEOUS FEE 
Amount Due: 5.00 
Amount Paid: 5.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
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CASE NUMBER 000800059 Property Rights 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 18.00 
Amount Paid: 18.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: 4.00 
Amount Paid: 4.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
lount Credit: 
Balance: 
20.75 
20.75 
0.00 
0.00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
07-17-00 Case filed by maxinep 
07-17-00 Judge PAYNE assigned. 
07-17-00 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
07-17-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 50.00 
07-17-00 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction 
07-17-00 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for 
Injunctive Relief 
07-17-00 Filed: Lis Pendens 
07-17-00 Filed: Lis Pendens 
07-17-00 Filed: Lis Pendens 
07-17-00 Filed: Lis Pendens 
07-17-00 Filed: Lis Pendens 
07-17-00 Filed: Lis Pendens 
07-17-00 Filed: Lis Pendens 
07-17-00 Filed: Notice of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
07-17-00 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
07-17-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 120.00 
07-17-00 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 50.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
07-17-00 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 120.00 
07-17-00 HEARING/PRELIMINARY INJUNCT. scheduled on July 31, 2000 at 
02:30 PM in COURTROOM with Judge PAYNE. 
07-26-00 Filed: Notice of Dismissal against defendant, FIDELITY TITLE. 
07-26-00 Filed return: Summons and Return of Service (Fidelity Title) 
Party Served: FIDELITY TITLE A UT CORP. 
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Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: July 20, 2000 
07-30-00 Minute Entry - MINUTES PHONE CONFERENCE/SCHEDULING 
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
Clerk: patm 
On 7-28-2000 the clerk received a telephone conference between Evan 
Schmutz, attorney for Plaintiff and Stephen Stoker who will be 
representing several of the defendant's. Mr. Schmutz told the 
clerk that Mr. Stoker could not be present on 7-31-2000 and asked 
that the matter be continued. The next available day is 8-17-2000. 
The parties both said that date would be good for them. They 
expect this hearing to be 2 to 3 hours. Matter is scheduled at 
2:30 to follow the law and motion calendar. 
07-30-00 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000800059 ID 1040268 
HEARING/PRELIMINARY INJUNCT.. 
Date: 08/14/2000 
Time: 02:30 p.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
21554 W. 9000 S. P.O.. Box 990 
DUCHESNE, UT 84021 
Before Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
The reason for the change is Date for event has been amended. 
As per a phone conference on 7-28-2000 this matter was rescheduled 
for 8-14-2000. 
07-30-00 HEARING/PRELIMINARY INJUNCT. scheduled on August 14, 2000 at 
02:31 PM in COURTROOM with Judge PAYNE. 
07-31-00 Filed return: Summons 
Party Served: FRANDSEN, GLENN 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: July 20, 2000 
08-04-00 Filed return: Summons - Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. 
Service Type: NonPersonal 
Service Date: July 25, 2000 
08-09-00 Note: HEARING/PRELIMINARY INJUNCT. calendar modified. 
08-09-00 Note: HEARING/PRELIMINARY INJUNCT. calendar modified. 
08-10-00 Filed return: Summons - L. Dale McAllister 
Party Served: MCALLISTER, L. DALE 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: August 01, 2000 
08-14-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
Clerk: patm 
PRESENT 
Audio 
Tape Number: 2 Tape Count: 4 48 
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CASE NUMBER 000800059 Property Rights 
HEARING 
TAPE: 2 COUNT: 4 48 
This matter was scheduled for a preliminary injunction. Parties 
contacted the clerk and said they had reached a stipulation and 
asked for today's hearing to be stricken. 
Based on this information the Court ordered this matter stricken. 
01-10-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000800059 ID 1107732 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE/ is scheduled. 
Date: 01/16/2001 
Time: 01:15 p.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
21554 W. 9000 S. P.O.. Box 990 
DUCHESNE, UT 84021 
Before Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
Telephone conference to schedule preliminary injunction hearing. 
Mr. Hussey is to initiate the call with all parites to the court. 
435-738-2753. 
01-10-01 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE/ scheduled on January 16, 2001 at 01:15 PM 
in COURTROOM with Judge PAYNE. 
01-16-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000800059 ID 1109395 
TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. is scheduled. 
Date: 01/29/2001 
Time: 01:15 p.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
21554 W. 9000 S. P.O.. Box 990 
DUCHESNE, UT 84 021 
Before Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
Telephone scheduling conference - Preliminary Injunction 
01-16-01 TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. scheduled on January 29, 2001 at 
01:15 PM in COURTROOM with Judge PAYNE. 
01-17-01 Filed: Notice of Telephonic Scheduling Conference 
01-19-01 Filed: Notice of Rescheduled Telephonic Scheduling Conference 
01-29-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONFERE 
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
Clerk: patm 
PRESENT 
Audio 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 3992 
HEARING 
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Mr. Hussey called in, stated the parties have settled the matter, 
telephone scheduling conference is not needed. 
03-14-01 Filed: Notice fo Telephonic Scheduling Conference 
03-15-01 Note: Called Mr. Hussey, told him we don't do telephone 
conferences at 1:30 pm. Needs to reschedule for 1:15. He said 
he will renotice. 
03-15-01 TELPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. scheduled on April 09, 2001 at 01:15 
PM in COURTROOM with Judge PAYNE. 
03-26-01 Filed: Notice of Rescheduled Telephonic Scheduling Conference 
04-09-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONFERE 
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
Clerk: patm 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CURTIS R HUSSEY 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEPHEN G STOKER 
Audio 
Tape Number: In Chambers 
HEARING 
TAPE: Chambe This matter is before the Court for telephone 
scheduling conference. Parties present on the phone are Curtis R. 
Hussey and Stephen G. Stoker. 
Mr. Hussey asked for a hearing on the plaintiffs motion for an 
injunction hearing. 1/2 day is requested. 
Matter is scheduled for 5-31-01 at 1:30 pm. Mr. Hussey will 
notice the parties for the hearing. 
MOTION FOR INJUNCTION is scheduled. 
Date: 05/31/2001 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
21554 W. 9000 S. P.O.. Box 990 
DUCHESNE, UT 84021 
before Judge A. LYNN PAYNE 
04-09-01 MOTION FOR INJUNCTION scheduled on May 31, 2001 at 01:30 PM in 
COURTROOM with Judge PAYNE. 
04-10-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000800059 ID 1148309 
MOTION FOR INJUNCTION is scheduled. 
Date: 05/31/2001 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
21554 W. 9000 S. P.O.. Box 990 
DUCHESNE, UT 84021 
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